Concepts of cause and causal inference are largely self-taught from early learning experiences. A model of causation that describes causes in terms of sufficient causes and their component causes illuminates important principles such as multicausality, the dependence of the strength of component causes on the prevalence of complementary component causes, and interaction between component causes.
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Philosophers agree that causal propositions cannot be proved, and find flaws or practical limitations in all philosophies of causal inference. Hence, the role of logic, belief, and observation in evaluating causal propositions is not settled. Causal inference in epidemiology is better viewed as an exercise in measurement of an effect rather than as a criterion-guided process for deciding whether an effect is present or not. What do we mean by causation? Even among those who study causation as the object of their work, the concept is largely self-taught, cobbled together fioni early experiences. As a youngster, each person develops and tests an inventory of causal explanations that brings meaning to perceived events and Ihat ultimately leads to more control of those events.
Because our first appreciation ofthe concept of causation is based on our own direct observations, the resulting concept is limited by the .scope of those obsei-vations. We typically observe causes with effects that are immediately apparent. For example, when one turns a light switch to the "on" position, one normally sees the instant efTect of the light going on. Nevertheless, the causal mechanism for getting a light to shine involves more than turning a light switch to "on." Suppose a storm has downed the electric lines to the building, or the witnng is faulty, or the bulb is burned out-in any of these cases, turning the switch on wili have no efFect One cause ofthe light going on is having the switch in the proper position, but along with it we must have a supply of power to the circuit, good wiring, and a working bulb. When all other factors are in place, turning the switch will cause the light to go on, but if one or more of the other factors is lacking, the light will not go on.
Despite the tendency to consider a switch as the unique cause of turning on a light, the complete causal mechanism is more intricate, and the switch is only one component of several. The tendency to identify the switch as the unique cause stems from its usual i-ote as the final factor that acts in the causal mechanism. The wiring can be considered part of the causal mechanism, but once it is put in place, it seldom warrants further attention. The switch, however, is often the only part of the mechanism that needs to be activated to obtam the effect of turning on the light. The effect usually occurs immediately after turning on the switch, and as a result we slip into the fi^ame of thinking in which we identify the switch as a unique cause. The inadequacy of this assumption is emphasized when the bulb goes bad and needs to he replaced, 'lliese concepts of causation that are established empirically early in life are too rudimentary to serve well as the basis for scientific theories. To enlarge upon them, we need a more general conceptual model that can serve as a common stalling point in discussions of causal theories.
SUFFICIENT AND COMPONENT CAUSES
The concept and definition of causation engender continuing debate among philosophers. Nevertheless, researchers interested in causal phenomena must adopt a working definition. We can define a cause of a specific disease event as an antecedent event, condition, or characteristic that was necessary for the occun'ence of the disease at the moment it occun-ed, given that other conditions are fixed. In other words, a cause of a disease event is an event, condition, or characteristic that preceded the disease event and without which the disease event either would not have occun-ed at all or would not have occurred until some later time. Under this definition it may be that no specific event, condition, or characteristic is sufiicient by itself to produce disease. This is not a definition, then, of a complete causal mechanism, but only a component of it. A "sufficient cause," which means a complete causal mechanism, can be defined as a set of minimal conditions and events that inevitably pT'oduce ciisease; "minimal" implies that all ofthe conditions or events are necessar}' to tliat occurrence. In disease etiology, the completion of a sufficient cause may be considered equivalent to the onset of disease. (Onset here refers to the onset of the earliest stage of the disease process, rather than the onset of signs or symptoms,) For biological effects, most and sometimes all of the components of a sufficient cause are unknown.' For example, tobacco smoking Ls a cause of lung cancer, but by itself it is not a sufficient cause. First the term smoking is too imprecise to be used in a causal description. One must specify the type of smoke (e.g., cigarette. cigar, pipe), whether it is filtered or unfiltered, the manner and frequency of inhalation, and the onset and duration of smoking. More importantly, smoking, even defined explicitly, will not cause cancer in everyone. Apparently, there are some people who, by virtue of their genetic makeup or previous experience, are susceptible to the effects of smoking, and others who are not. These susceptihiWty factors are other components in the various causa] mechanisms through which smoking causes lung cancer. Figure 1 is minimally sufficient to produce the disease: that is, there is no redundant or extraneous component cause. Kach one is a necessary part of that specific causal
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One Causal Mechanism
Single Component Cause mechanism. A specific component cause may play a role in one, two, or all three of the causal mechanisms pictured.
MULTiCAUSAUTY
The model of causation implied by Figure 1 illuminates several important principles regaRJiiig causes. Perhaps the most important of these principles is self-evident from the model: A given disease can be caused by more than one causal mechanism, and ever}' causal mechanism involves tbe joint action of a multitude of component causes. Consider as an example the cause of a broken bip. Suppose tbat someone experiences a naumatie injury to the bead tbal leads to a permanent disturbance in equilibrium. Many years later, the faulty equilibrium plays a causal role in a fall tbat occui"s wbile tbe person is walking on an icy patb. Tbe fall results in a broken hip. Otber factors playing a causal role for the broken bip could include tbe type of sboe tbe person was wearing, tbe lack of a baiidrail along tbe patb, a strong wind, or the body weigbt of tbe person, among others. Tbe complete causal mechanism involves a multitude of factors. Some factors, such as tbe person's weigbt and tbe earlier injury tbat resulted in tbe equilibrium disturbance, reflect earlier events tbat bave bad a lingering efTect. Some causal components are genetic and would affect the person's weight, gait, behavior, recovery from the earlier trauma, and so fortb. Otber factors, sucb as the force of tbe wind, are environmental. It is a reasonably safe assertion tbat tbere are nearly always some genetic and some environmental component causes in every causa! mecbanism, Tbus, even an event sucb as a fall on an icy patb leading to a broken bip is part of a complicated causal mecbanism tbat involves many component causes.
Tbe importance of multicausality is tbat most identified causes are neitber necessar}' nor sufficient to produce disease, Nevertbeless, a cause need not be eitber necessary or sufficient for its removal to result in disease prevention. If a component cause tbat is neitber necessary nor sufficient is blocked, a substantial amount of disease may be prevented, Tbat tbe cause is not necessary implies tbat some disease may still occur after tbe cause is blocked, but a component cause wili nevertheless be a necessary cause for some of the cases tbat occur, Tbat tbe component cause is not sufficient implies tbat otber component causes must interact witb it to produce tbe disease, and tbat blocking any of tbem would result in prevention of some cases of disease. Tbus, one need not identify every component cause to prevent some cases of disease. In tbe law. a distinction is sometimes made among component causes to identify tbose tbat may be considered a "proximate" cause, implying a more direct connection or responsibility for tbe outcome.Ŝ
TRENGTH OF A CAUSE
In epidemiology, tbe strengtb of a factor's effect is usually measured by tbe cbange in disease frequency produced by introducing tbe factor into a population. Tbis cbange may be measured in absolute or relative terms. In eitber case, tlie strength of an effect may bave tremendous public health significance, bul it may have little biological signili :ance. Tbe reason is that given a spedfic causal mechanism, any ol' the component causes can have strong or weak efTects. Tbe aetua! identity of tbe constituent components of tbe causal mecbanism amounts to the biology of causation. In contrast, the strengtb of a factor's effect depends on the time-specific distribution of its causal complements in the population. Over a span of time, tbe strengtb of tbe effect of a given factor on the occurrence of a given disease may change, because tbe prevalence of its causal complements in various causal mechanisms may also cbange. The causal mechanisms in which the factor and its complements act could remain unchanged, however.
INTERACTION AMONG CAUSES
Tbe causal pie model posits tbat several causal components act in concert to produce an effect. "Acting in concert" does not necessarily imply that factors must act at tbe same dme. Consider tbe example above of tbe person wbo sustained trauma to the head that resulted in an equilibrium disturbance, wbieh led, years later, to a fall on an icy path. Tbe earlier head trauma played a causal role in tbe later hip fracture: so did the weatber conditions on the day of tbe fracture. If both of tbese factors played a causal role in tbe bip fracture, tben tbey interacted with one anotber to cause the fracture, despite the fact tbat tbeir time of aetion is many years apart. We would say tbat any and all of the factors in tbe same causal mechanism for disease interact witb one anotber to cause disease. Tbus, tbe bead irauma interacted with the weather conditions, as well as with otber component causes sucb as tbe type of footwear, tbe absence of a bandbold, and any otber conditions that were necessary to tbe causal mecbanism of tbe fall and the broken hip tbat resulted. One can view each causal pie as a set of interacting causal components. I'his model provides a biological basis for a concept of 
SUM OF ATTRIBUTABLE FRACTIONS
Consider the data on rates of head and neck cancer according to whether people have been cigarette smokers, alcohol driniiers, or both ( Table 1 ). Suppose that the differences in the rates all rettect causal efTects. /\mong those people who are smokers and also alcohol drinkers, what proportion of the cases is attributable to the effect of smoking? We know that the rate for these people is 12 cases per 100000 person-years. If these same people were not smokers, we can infer that their rate of head and neck cancer would be 3 cases per 100000 person-years, if this difference reflects the causal role of smoking, then we might infer that 9 of every 12 cases, or 75%, are attributable to smoking among those who both smoke and drink alcohol. If we tum the question around and ask what proportion of disease among these same people is attributable to alcohol drinking, we would be able to attribute 8 of eveiy 12 cases, or 67%, to alcohol drinking.
How can we attribute 75"Ai of the cases to smoking and 67"/o to alcohol drinking among those who are exposed to both? We can because some cases are counted more than once. Smoking and alcohol interact in some cases of head and neck cancer, and these cases are attributable both to smoking ami to alcohol drinking. One consequence of interaction is that we should not expect that the proportions of disease attributable to various component causes will sum to 100%.
A widely discussed (though unpublished) paper from the 1970s, written by scientists at the National Institutes of Health, proposed tbat as much as 4O''/() of cancer is attributable to occupational exposures. Many scientists thought that this fr^aclion was an overestimate, and ai^ed against this claim."*' One of the arguments used in rebuttal was as follows; X percent of cancer is caused by smoking, y percent by diet, z percent by aicohoi, and so on; when all these percentages are added up. oniy a small percentage, much less than 40%, is left for occupational causes. But this rebuttal is fallacious, because it is based on the naive view that every case of disease has a single cause, and that two causes cannot both contribute to the same case of cancer. In fact, smce diet, smokiiig, asbestos, and vanous occupational exposures, along with otber factors, interact with nne another and with genetic factoi's to cause cancer, each case of caneer could be attributed repeatedly to many separate component causes. Tbe sum of disease attributable to vaiious component causes thus has no upper limit.
A single cause or category of causes that is present in every sulTicient cause of disease will have an attributable fraction of 100%, Much publicity attended the pronouncement in 1960 that as much as 90*' /i) of cancer is caused by environmental factors.' Since "environment" can be thought of as an all-embracing category that represents nongenetic causes, wbich must be present to some extent in every sufficient cause, it is clear on a priori grounds that 100% of any disease is environmentally caused. Thus, lligginson's estimate of 9O"/o was an underestimate.
Similarly, one can show that lOO' Vu of any disease is inherited. MacMalion ' dted the example of yellow shanks, ^ a trait occurring in certain strains of fowl fed yellow com. Both the right set of genes and the yellow-com diet are necessary to produce yellow shanks. A fanner with several strains of fowl, feeding them all only yellow com, would consider yellow shanks to be a genetic condition, since only one strain would get yellow shanks, despite all strains getting the same diet. A different fanner, who owned only the strain liable to get yellow shanks, but who fed some of the bii'ds yellow com and others white com. would consider yellow shanks to be an environmentally detemiined condition because it depends on diet. In reality, yellow shanks is determined by both genes and environment; there is no reasonable way to allocate a portion of tlie causation to either genes or environment. Similarly, every case of every disease has some enviranmenta! and some genetic component causes, and therefore every case can be attributed both to genes and to environmeTit. No paradox exists as long as it is understood that the fractions of disease attributable to genes and to environment overlap.
Many researchers bave spent considerable efTort in developing heritabilit}' indices, wbicb are supposed to measure the fraction of disease that is inherited. Unfortunately, these indices only assess the relative role of environmental and genetic causes of disease in a particular setting. For example, some genetic causes may be necessary components of every causal mechanism. If everyone in a population has an identical set of the genes that cause disease, however, tbeir efTect is not included in heritabiiity indices, despite the fact that having these genes is a cause of the disease. I he two fanners in the example above would offer very difTerent values for the heritabiiity of yellow shanks, despite the fact tbat the condition is always 100% dependent on having certain genes.
If all genetic factors that detennine disease are taken into account, whether or not they vary witliin populations, then 100% of disease can be said to be inherited. Analogously, 100% of any disease is environmentally caused, even those diseases that we often consider purely genetic. Phenylketonuria, for example, is considered by many to be purely genetic. Nonetheless, the mental retardation that it may cause can be prevented by appropriate dietary intervention.
The treatment for phenylketonuria illustrates the interaction of genes and environment to cause a disease commonly thought to be purely genetic. What about an apparently purely environmental cause of death such as death from an automobile accident? It is easy to conceive of genetic traits tbat lead to psychiatric problems such as alcoholism, which in tum lead to dnink driving and consequent fatality. Consider another more extreme environmental example, being killed by lightning. Paitially heritable psychiatric conditions can influence whether someone will take shelter during a lightning storm; genetic traits sucb as athletic ability may influence the likelihood of being outside when a lightning storm strikes; and having an outdoor occupation or pastime that is more frequent among men (or women), and in that sense genetic, would also inilucnce the probability of getting killed by lightning. The argument may seem stretched on this e.iiiamjjle, but the point that every case of disease has both genetic and environmental causes is defensible and has important implications for research.
MAKING CAUSAL INFERENCES
Causal inference may be viewed as a special case of the more general process of scienlilic reasoning, about which there is substantial scholarly debate among scientists and philosophers.
Impossibility of Proof
Vigorous debate is a characteristic of modem scientific philosophy, no less in epidemiology than in other areas. Perhaps the most imf)ortant common thread that emerges From the debated philosophies stems from lStlicentLiiy empiricist David I lume's observation that proof is impossible in empirical science. This simple fact is espedally important to epidemiologists, who often face the criticism tbat proof is impossible in epidemiology', witli the implication that it is possible in other scientific disciplines. Such criticism may stem from a view that experiments are the definitive source of scientific knowledge. Such a view is mistaken on at least two counts. First, the nonexperimental nature of a science does not preclude impressive scientific discovei-ies; the myriad examples include plate tectonics, the evolution of species, planets orbiting other stars, and the efTects of cigarette smoking on human health. Hven when they are possible. experiments (including randomized trials) do not provide anything approaching proof, and in fact may be controveraal. contradictory, or irreprodiicible. The cold-fusion dehade demonstrates well that neither physical nor experimental science is immune to such probiems.
Some experimental scientists hold that epidemiologic relations are only suggestive, and believe that detailed laboratory study of mechanisms within single individuals ean reveal cause-effect relations with certainty. This view overlooks the fact that all relations arc suggestive m exactly the manner discussed by Hume: even the most careful and detailed mechanistic dissection of individual events cannot provide more than associations, albeit at a finer level. Laboratory studies often involve a degree of observer control that cannot be approached in epidemiology; it is only this control, not the level of observation, that can strengthen the inferences Irom laboratoiy studies. Furthermore, such control is no guarantee against error All of the fruits of scientific work, in epidemiology or other disciplines, are at best only tentative formulations of a description of nature, even wben the work itself is carried out without mistakes.
Testing Competing Epidemiologie Theories
Biological knowledge about epidemiologie hypotheses Ls often scant, making the hypotheses themselves at times little more than vague statements of causal association between exposLu^e and disease, sucb as "smoking causes cardiovascular disease." These vague hypotheses have only vague consequences Ihat can be dilTicult to test To cope with this vagueness, epidemiologists usually focus on testing tiie negation of the causal hypothesis, that is, tbe null hypothesis that the exposure does not have a causal relation to disease. Then, any observed association can potentially refute the hypothesis, subject to tlie assumption (auxiliary hypothesis) that biases are absent. lithe causal mecbanism is stated specifically enough, epidemiologie observations (.mder some circumstances might provide crucial tests of competing non-nutl causal hypotheses. On the other hand, many epidemiologie .studies are not designed to test a causal hypothesis. For example, epidemiologie data related to the finding that women who took replacement estrogen therapy were at a considerably higher risk for endometrial cancer was examined by Horwitz and Feinstein, who conjectured a competing theory to explain the association: they proposed that women taking estrogen experienced symptoms such as bleeding that induced them to consult a physician.'* The resulting diagnostic workup led to the detection of endometriat cancer at an earlier stage in these women, as compared with women not taking estrogens, Many epidemiologie observations could have been and were used to evaluate tbese competing hypotheses. The causal theory predicted that the risk of endometi-ial cancer would tend to increase with increasing use (dose, frequency, and duration) of estrogens, as for other carcinogenic exposures. The detection bias theory, on the other hand, predicted that women who had used estrogens only for a short white would have the gi-eatest risk, since the symptoms related to estrogen use that led to the medical consultation tend to appear soon after use begins. Because the association of recent estrogen use and endometrial cancer was the same in both long-term and short-term estrogen users, the detection bias theoiy was refuted as an explanation for all but a small fraction of endometrial cancer cases occurring after estrogen use.
The endometrial cancer example illustrates a critical point in understanding the process of causal inference in epidemiologie studies: many of the hypotheses being evalu* ated in the interpretation of epidemiotogic studies are noncausal hypotheses, in the sense of involving no causal connection between tbe study exposure and the disease. For example, hypotheses that amount to explanations of how specific types of bias could bave led to an association between exposure and disease are the ustial alternatives to the primary study hypothesis that the epidemiologist needs to consider in drawing inferences. Much of the interpretation of epidemiologie studies amounts to the testing of such noncausal explanations,
THE DUBIOUS VALUE OF CAUSAL CRITERIA
In practice, how do epidemiologists separate out the causal from the noncausal explanations? Despite philosophic criticisms of inductive inference, inductively oriented causal criteria have commonly been used to make sueh inferences. If a set of necessary and suffident causal criteria could be used to distinguish causal from noncausal relations in epidemiologie studies, the job of the scientist would be eased considerably. With such
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criteria, ail the concerns about the logic or lack thereof in causal inference could be forgotten: it would only be necessaiy to consult the checklist of criteria to see if a relation were causal. We know from piiilosophy that a set of sufficient criteria does not exist. Nevertheless, lists of causal criteria have become popular, possibly because they seem to provide a road map through complicated territory.
Hill's Criteria
A commonly used set of criteria was proposed by Hill,"^ it was an expansion of a set of criteria offered previously in the landmark surgeon general's repoit on smoking and health," which in tum were anticipated by tbe inductive canons of John Stuart Mill'â nd the rules given by Hume. ' ' Hill suggested that the following aspects of an association be considered in attempting to distinguish causal from noncausal associations: (1) strength, (2} consistency, (3) specificity, (4) temporality, (5) biological gradient, (6) plausibility, (7) coherence, (8) experimental evidence, and (9) analogy. These criteria suffer from their induetivist origin, but their popularity demands a more specific discussion of their utility. /. Strength. Hill's argument is essentially that strong associations are more likely to be causal than weak associations because, if they could be explained by some otber factor, the effect of that factor would have to be even stronger than the observed assodation and therefore would have become evident. Weak associations, on the other hand, are more likely to be explained by undetected biases. To some extent tbis is a reasonable argument but, as Hill himself acknowledged, the tact that an association is weak does not rule out a causal connection, A commonly cited counterexample is the relation between dgarette smoking and cardiovascular disease: one explanation for this relation being weak is tbat cardiovascular disease is common, making any ratio measure of effect comparatively small compared with ratio measures for diseases that are less common.'"* Nevertheless, dgarette smoking is not serioasly doubted as a cause of cardiovascular disease. Another example would be passive smoking and lung cancer, a weak association that few consider to be noncausal.
Counterexamples of strong but noncausal associations ai^e also not bard to find; any study with strong confounding illustrates the phenomenon. For example, consider the strong but noncausal relation between Down syndrome and birth rank, which is confounded by the relation between Down syndrome and maternal age. Of course, once the confounding factor is identified, the association is diminished by adjustment for the factor These examples remind us that a strong association is neither necessary nor sufficient for causality, nor is weakness necessary or sufficient for absence of causality. Furthermore, neither relative risk nor any othei^ measure of association is a biologically consi.stent feature of an association; as described above, sudi measures of association are cbaracteristics of a given population that depend on tlie relative prevalence of other causes in that population. A strong association serves only to mle out hypotheses that the assodation is entirely due to one weak unmeasured confounder or other source of modest bias, 2. Consistency. Consistency refers to the repeated observation of an assodation in different populations under different circumstances. Lack of consistency, however, does not rule out a causal assodation, beeause some effects are produced by their causes only under unusual circumstances. Moi'e precisely, the effect of a causal agent cannot occur unless the eomplementary component causes act, or have already acted, to complete a sufficient cause. These conditions will not always be met. Tlius, transtiisions can cause HIV infection but they do not always do so: the virus must also be present. Tampon use can cause toxic shock syndrome, but only rarely when certain other, perhaps imknown, conditions are met. Consistency is apparent only after all the relevant details of a causal mechanism are understood, which is to say very seldom. Furthermore, even studies of exactly the same phenomena can be expected to yield different results simply because they differ in their methods and random errors. Consistency serves only to rule out hypotheses that the association is attributable to some factor that varies across stiadies.
One mistake in implementing the consistency criterion is so common that it desen,'es special mention. It is sometimes claimed that a literature or set of results is inconsistent simply beeause some results are "statistically significant" and some are not This sort of evaluation is completely fallacious even if one accepts the use of significance testing methods: The results (effect estimates) from the studies could all be identical even if many were significant and many were not, tbe difference in significance arising solely because of difTerences in the standard eixors or sizes of the studies. Furthermore, this fallacy is not eliminated by "standai^dizing" estimates.
3. Specificity. Tbe criterion of specificity requires that a cause leads to a single effect, not multiple efTects. This argument has often been advanced to refute causal interpretations of exposures that appear to relate to myriad effects-for example, by those seeking to exonerate smoking as a cause of lung cancer. Unfortunately, the criterion is invalid as a general mle. Causes of a given effect cannot be expected to lack all other effects. In fact, everyday experience teaches us repeatedly that single events or conditions may have many effects. Smoking is an excellent example; it leads to many effects in the smoker, in part because smoking involves exposure to a wide range of agents.'^"' The existence of one effect of an exposure does not detract from the possibility that another effect exisls.
On the other hand, Weiss"' convincingly argued that specificity can be used to distinguish some causal hypotheses from noncausal hypotheses, when the causal hypothesis predicts a relation with one outcome but no relation with another outcome. 'ITius, specificity can come into play when il can be logically deduced Irom the causal hypothesis in question.
Temporality.
Temporality refers to the necessity for a cause to precede an effect in time. 'ITiis criterion is inarguable, insofar as any claimed observation of causation must involve the putative cause C preceding the putative effect D. It does not however, follow that a reverse time order is evidence against tlie hypothesis that C can cause D. Rather, observations in which C followed D merely show that C could not have caused D in these instances; they provide no evidence for or against the hypothesis that C can cause D in those instances in which it precedes D. monotonic relation to exist For example, more smoking means more carcinogen exposure and more tissue damage, hence more opportunity for carcinogenesis. Some eausal associations, however, show a single jump (threshold) rather than a monotonic trend; an example is the association between DES and adenocarcinoma of the vagina. A possihie explanation is that the doses of DKS that were administered were alt sufficiently great to produce tlie maximum elTect from DP^S. Under this hypothesis, for all those exposed to DES, the development of disease would depend entirely on (ither eomponent causes.
Alcohol consumption ajid mortality is another example. Death rates are higher among nondrinkers than among moderate drinkers, hut ascend to the highest levels for heavy drinkers. There is considerable debate about which paits of tlie J-shaped dose-response curve are causally related to alcohol consumption and which parts are noncausal artifacts stemming from confounding or other biases. Some studies appear to find only an increasing relation between alcohol consumption eind mortality, possibly because the categories of alcohol consumption are too broad to distinguish dilTerent rates aanong moderate drinkers and nondrinkers.
Associations that do show a monotonie trend in disease frequency with increasing levels of exposure are not necessarily eausal; eonfounding can result in a monotonic relation between a noncausal ilsk factoi' and disease if the confounding factor itself demonstrates a biological gradient in its relation witli disease. The noneaiisal relation between hirth rank eind Down syndrome mentioned in pail 1 above shows a biological gradient that merely reflects the progi'essive relation between maternal age and Down syndrome occurrence.
These examples imply that the existence of a monotonic association is neither necessary nor sufficient for a eausal relation. A nonmonotonic relation only refutes those causal hypotlieses specific enough to predict a monotonic dose-response curve.
6, Plausibility. Plausibility relers to the biological plausibility ol the hj'pothesis, an important concern but one that is far fh)m objective or absolute. Sartwell, emphasizing this point cited tlie 1861 comments of Cheever on the etiology of typhus before its mode of transmission (via body lice) was known: "It could be no moi-e ridiculoiLs for tlie stranger who passed tlie night in the steerage of an emigi-ant ship to ascrihe the typhus, which he there contracted, to tlie vermin witli whicb hfxlies of the sick might be mfested. An adequate cause, one reasonable ui itself, must con-ect the coincidences of simple experience."'' What was to Qieever an implaiLsible explanation turned out to be the correct explanation, since it was indeed the vermin that caused tlie ty(ihus infection. Such is tiie problem with plausibility: it is too often not based on logic or data, but only on prior beliefs. This Ls not to say that biological knowledge should be discounted when evaluating a new hy[)othesLS, but only to point out the difllculty in applying that knowledge.
'ITie Bayesian approach to inference attempts to deal with this problem by requiring that one quantify, on a probability (0 to 1) scale, the certainty thai one has in prior beliefs, as well as in new hypotheses. This quantification displays the dogmatism or openmindedne.ss ofthe analyst in a public fashion, with ceitaitity values near 1 or 0 betraying a strong commitment of the analyst for or against a hypothesis, It can also provide a means of testing those quantified beliefs against new evidenee,'" Nevertheless, the Bayesian approach cannot transfonn plausibility into an objective causal criterion.
7 Coherence. Taken fiiDm the sui^eon general's report on smoking and healtli," the temi coherence implies that a cause-and-efTect interpretation for an assoeiation does not conflict with whal is known of tlie natural history and biology of the disease. The examples Hill gave for coherence, such as the histopathologic effect of smoking on bronchial epithelium (in reference to tlie association between smoking and lung cancer) or the difference in lung eaneer incidence hy gender, could reasonably be considered exajnples of plausibility as well as coherence; the distinction appears to be a fine one. Hill emphasized that the absence of coherent infojinadon, as distinguished, appai^-ently, from the presence of conflicting infonnation, .should not be taken as evidence against an association hemg considered causal. On tlie other hand, presence of conllicting information may indeed refute a hypothesis, but one tnust always remember that the conllicting infbnnation may be mistaken or misinterpreted,'^8 , Experimental evidence. It is not elear what I lill meant by expeiimcntal evidence. It mig^t have refen'ed to evidence from laboratory' experiments on animals, or to evidence from human experiments. Evidence from hiunaii experiments, however, is seldom available for most epidemioiogic reseairh questions, and animal evidence relates to different species and usually to levels of exposure very difTerent from those humans experience. From Hill's examples, il seems that what he had in mind for experimental evidenee was the result of removal of .some harmful exposure in an interventi(jn or prevention program, leather than the results of laboratoiy experiments. 'ITie lack of avaiiabilit}' of such evidenee would at least be a pragmatic difficulty in making this a criterion for inference. Logically, however, expeiimental evidence is not a criterion but a test of the causal hypothesis, a test that is simply unavailable in most circumstances. Altliough exjierimental tests ean be much stronger than other tests, they are often not as decisive as thought, because of difficulties in inteipretation. For example, one can attempt to test the hypothesis that malaria is caused by swamp gas by draining swamps in some areas and not in others to see if the malaria rates among residents are affected by the draining. As predicted by the hy-))othesis, the rates will drop in the areas where the swamps are drained. As Popper emphasized, however, there are always many alternative explanations for the outcome of every experiment In this example, one alternative, which happens to be correct, is that mosquitoes are responsible for malaria transmission.
9. Antilogy. Whatever insight might be derived from analogy is handicapped by the inventive imagination of scientists who can find analogies everywhere. At best, ajialogy provides a souree of more elaborate hy{iotheses about the associations under study; absence of such analogies only reflects lack of imagination or experience, not falsify of the hypothesis.
Is There Any Use for Causal Criteria?
As is evident the standards of epidemioiogic evidence offered by Hill are saddled with reservations and exceptions. I lill himself was ambivalent about the utility of these "viewpoints" (he did not use the word criteria in the paper). On tlie one hand, he asked, "In what circumstances can we pass from this observed association to a verdict of causation?" Yet despite speaking of verdicts on causation, he disagreed that any "hard-and-fast rules of evidence" existed by which to judge causadon: This conclusion accords with the views of Hume, Popper, and others that causal inferences cannot attain the certainty of logica] deductions. Although some sdentists continue to promulgate causal criteria as aids to inference, others argue that it is actually detrimental to cloud the inferential process by considering checklist criteria.' An intermediate, reftitationist reproach seeks to transform the criteria into deductive tests of causal hypotheses,^""^' Such an approach avoids the temptation to use causal criteria simply to buttress pet theolies at hand, and instead allows epidemiologists to focus on evaluating competing causal theories using crucial observations.
CRITERIA TO JUDGE WHETHER SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IS VALID
Just as causal criteria cannot be used to establish the validity of an inference, there are no criteria that can be used to establish the validity of data or evidence. There are methods by which validity can be assessed, but this assessment would not resemble anything like the application of rigid criteria.
Some of the difficulty can be understood by taking the view that sdentific evidence can usually be viewed as a form of measurement. If an epidemiologic study sets out to assess the relation between exposure to tobacco smoke and lung cancer risk, the results can and should be framed as a measure ol" causal elfect. such as the ratio of the risk of lung cancer among smokers to the risk among nonsmokers. Like any measurement, the measurement of a causal efFect is subject to measurement erroi". For a scientific study, measurement error encompasses more than the eiTor that we might have in mind when we attempt to measure the length of a piece of carpet. In addition to statistical error, the measurement error subsumes problems that relate to study design, including subject selection and retention, information acquisition, and uncontrolled confounding and other sources of bias. There are many individual sources of possible error. It is not suffident to chai^acterize a study as having or not having any of these sources of error, since nearly every study will have nearly every type of error The real issue is to quantify the errors. As there is no precise cutoff with respect to how much error can be tolerated before a study must be considered invalid, there is no altemative to the quantification of study errors to the extent possible.
Although there are no absolute criteria for assessing the validity of scientific evidence, it is stOl possible to assess the validity of a study. What is required is much more than the application of a list of criteria. Instead, one must apply thorough criticism, with the goal of obtaining a quantified evaluation of the total error that afflicts the study. This type of assessment is not one that can be done easily by someone who lacks the skiils and training of a scientist familial' with the subject matter and the sdentific methods that were employed. Neither can it be applied readily by judges in court, nor by sdentists who either lack the requisite knowledge or who do not take the time to penetrate the work. •
